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Resumen:
El objetivo principal de este estudio es investigar la descripción del método socrático de Esquines de Esfeto, con especial
foco en la llamada «          socrática» y el relacionado argumento por analogía. El trabajo comprende tres secciones
principales, dedicadas al examen de estas herramientas metodológicas socráticas en el diálogo Aspasia (i), a través de una
lectura atenta del testimonio de Cicerón en De Inv. 1.31.51-53; en el Alcibíades (ii), refiriendo especialmente a tres
fragmentos del diálogo preservado por Elio Aristides (De rhet. 1.61-62; 1.74); y en el Milcíades (iii), con especial
atención a un fragmento del papiro (POxy. 2890 verso), el cual presenta también un caso de la llamada «expert-analogy».
Este análisis apunta a reconstruir una imagen lo más completa posible del método socrático retratado por Esquines, que
pueda ser comparada provechosamente con aquellas presentadas por Platón y Jenofonte. En la conclusión, se realizan
algunas consideraciones finales a la luz de las más amplias descripciones provistas por los diálogos de Platón y las obras
socráticas de Jenofonte.
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The Socratic Method in Aeschines
Abstract:
The main objective of this study is to investigate Aeschines of Sphettus’ account of the Socratic method, with a special
focus on the so-called «Socratic              » and the (related) argument  by  analogy. The paper comprises three main sections,
devoted to an examination of these Socratic methodological tools in the Aspasia (i), through a close reading of Cicero’s
testimony in De inv. 1.31.51-53; in the Alcibiades (ii), by especially referring to three fragments of the dialogue preserved
by Aelius Aristides (De rhet. 1.61-62; 1.74); and in the Miltiades (iii), with special regard to a papyrus fragment (POxy.
2890 verso) which also presents an occurrence of the so-called «expert-analogy». The analysis is aimed to reconstruct as
complete a picture as possible of Aeschines’ portrayal of the Socratic method, one that can be profitably compared to
those presented by Plato and Xenophon. In the concluding section some final considerations are thus made in the light of
the broader accounts provided by Plato’s dialogues and Xenophon’s Socratic works.
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1. INTRODUCTION
large and growing body of literature has investiga-
ted the Socratic method and particularly the
«Socratic method of teaching». Unsurprisingly, many
of these studies have been devoted to Plato’s  Socratic
dialogues1, with a major focus on the refutative procedure
of                but (to a lesser degree) Xenophon’s Socratic
1 To give but few examples, see BENSON, H. H., «Socratic Method», in MORRISON, D. R., The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, New York,
2011, pp. 179-200; BRICKHOUSE, T. C. & SMITH, N. D., «Socratic Teaching and Socratic Method», in SIEGEL, H., The Oxford Handbook of
Philosophy of Education, New York, 2009, pp. 177-194. In the latter study it is expressly stated that «it is plainly the Socrates of Plato’s early or
‘Socratic’ dialogues that people have in mind when they discuss the ‘Socratic method’ or ‘Socratic teaching’» (p. 191, note 1).
2 The studies published are too numerous to be mentioned exhaustively. The nature of the so-called «Socratic method» and of           in Plato raises
a variety of questions and thorny problems that falls beyond the scope of this paper. For the most recent debate see at least VLASTOS, G., «The
Socratic Elenchus», Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1 (1983), pp. 27-58; BENSON, H. H., «The Priority of Definition and the Socratic
Elenchus», Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 8 (1990), pp. 19-65; BENSON, H. H., «The Dissolution of the Problem of the Elenchus», Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 13 (1995), pp. 45-112; GIANNANTONI, G., Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone,
edizione postuma a cura di Bruno Centrone, Napoli, 2005, pp. 141-195. Scholars have gone so far as to assert that «there is no such thing as the
‘Socratic elenchos’»: BRICKHOUSE, T. C. & SMITH, N. D., «The Socratic Elenchos?», in SCOTT, G. A., Does Socrates Have a Method?
Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond, University Park (PA), 2002, p. 147.
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writings have also been taken into account in this
regard3.
The present paper aims to explore a further account
on Socrates’ method, namely the portrayal provided by
Aeschines of Sphettus’ dialogues. Even though Aeschines’
account immediately evokes the issue of          which is also
closely bound up with Socrates’ «method of teaching»4, I
would like to focus here on two different aspects, recurring
in more than one work: the so-called «Socratic               » and
the related argument by analogy.
Now, like the Socratic method  in  general, Socratic
    has been mainly investigated with regard to Plato5
or, at most, to Plato and Xenophon6, or Plato and Aristotle7.
The use of expert-analogies in the logoi Sokratikoi, on the
other hand, has been recently examined by Sandstad, who
also takes two of Aeschines’ dialogues briefly into account8.
What seems to be lacking, then, is a comprehensive
study of the Aeschinean Socrates’ method, one that brings
together – in particular – all the references to  and
to the argument by analogy in Aeschines’ dialogues. The
following three sections of the paper will thus investigate
this aspect of the Socratic method in the Aspasia (section
II), the Alcibiades (section III) and the Miltiades (section
IV).
As far as the Aspasia is concerned, a fundamental
testimony is provided by Cicero, who reports a conversation
between Aspasia, Xenophon and his wife precisely to
illustrate a case of induction (De inv. 1.31.51-53). Indeed,
the quotation of the Aspasia passage is placed at the beginning
of a section on the different types of argumentation
(1.31.51-77), whose first part is devoted to inductio
(1.31.51-56). Cicero’s testimony offers a good starting point
for our analysis, as it features both the above-mentioned
elements of the Socratic method: not only does the whole
passage have the structure of the Socratic         , but
Aspasia resorts –more specifically– to the argument by
analogy, presented in other dialogues as a Socratic
methodological tool.
This is the case with the Alcibiades and, more
specifically, with the three fragments preserved by Aelius
Aristides (De rhet. 1.61-62; 1.74). Assuming –as we will
see– a particular order for these fragments, Socrates appears
to be adopting an argument by analogy in the last section
of the dialogue: he would first be presenting some examples
drawn from human experience (sickness and healing),
where it is possible to benefit from both
and                  and then he would be applying this oppo-
sition to his personal experience with Alcibiades, expressing
his conviction that he could improve the young man
         and not
A further occurrence of the argument by analogy
seems to be found in the Miltiades, at least according to a
papyrus fragment (POxy. 2890 verso) which hints at an
analogy  with  the field of          established  within the
context of a discussion on              The (misleading) analo-
gy between the teaching of virtue and the teaching of the
banausic arts is arguably drawn by Socrates himself, with
the aim of opposing the (easy) search for teachers of
specific           and the (much more complicated) search for
teachers of virtue.
In the light of the fuller accounts provided in the
Aspasia and the Alcibiades, the last part of the paper will
thus attempt to analyse the Miltiades fragment, so as to
reconstruct, in the concluding section (V), as complete a
picture as possible of Aeschines’ portrayal of the Socratic
method, one that can be profitably juxtaposed and compared
to those presented by Plato and Xenophon.
3 WELLMAN, R. R., «Socratic Method in Xenophon», Journal of the History of Ideas, 37/2 (1976), pp. 307-318; MOORE, C., «Xenophon’s
Socratic Education in Memorabilia Book 4», in MOORE, C. & STAVRU, A., Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, Leiden, 2018, pp. 500-520.
4 See KAHN, C. H., «Aeschines on Socratic Eros», in VANDER WAERDT, P. A., The Socratic Movement, Ithaca-London, 1994, pp. 87-106 and
MÁRSICO, C., «Shock, Erotics, Plagiarism, and Fraud: Aspects of Aeschines of Sphettus’ Philosophy», in MOORE, C. & STAVRU, A., Socrates and
the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 202-220.
5 KAHN, C. H., Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form, Cambridge, 1996, p. 111 ff. In earlier studies sections
or chapters on  are included in works devoted to Plato or to the Socratic method in Plato: see ROBINSON, R., Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, Oxford,
1953, pp. 35-50; GULLEY, N., The Philosophy of Socrates, London, 1968, pp. 13-21; SANTAS, G., Socrates: Philosophy in Plato’s Early
Dialogues, Boston, 1979, pp. 136-155. See also the brief overview in GUTHRIE, W. K. C., Socrates, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 105-110.
6 McPHERRAN, M., «Socratic Epagôgê and Socratic Induction», Journal of the History of Philosophy, 45/3 (2007), pp. 347-364.
7 AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», in FINK, J. L., The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle, Cambridge,
2012, pp. 224-250. He also concisely tackles Socratic induction in Xenophon (230-232). A study by McCaskey broadens the analysis of induction
to the later Socratic tradition, specifically to Bacon’s and Whewell’s philosophies: see McCASKEY, J. P., «Induction in the Socratic Tradition», in
BIONDI, P. C. & GROARKE, L., Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction, Berlin, 2014, pp. 161-192.
8 SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates’ Expert-Analogies», in MOORE, C. & STAVRU, A., Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue,
pp. 319-335. On Socrates’ expert-analogies see also APARICIO VILLALONGA, C., El ejemplo de los oficios en los diálogos de Platón: una vía de
acceso a su filosofía, Tesis Doctoral, Universidad de las Islas Baleares, 2014, and AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», pp.
228-229, who briefly touches upon Aeschines’ Aspasia.
’
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2. THE ASPASIA
Cicero’s quotation in De inventione 1.31.51-53 (VI
A 70 SSR = 108 P.)9 preserves the largest surviving section
of Aeschines’ Aspasia –a lost dialogue that most testimonies
depict as centred on the problem of           10– and repre-
sents one of the richest sources for reconstructing the
philosophical content of this work11.
The passage from the Aspasia is quoted at the
beginning of a section on the different types of
argumentation (1.31.51-77), which includes a first part
devoted to inductio (1.31.51-56) and a second part devoted
to the deductive method (ratiocinatio: 1.31.57-75)12.
Paragraph 51 starts with the general statement «omnis […]
argumentatio aut per inductionem tractanda est aut per
ratiocinationem», followed by a definition of inductio that
Cicero provides just before quoting a portion of Aeschines’
dialogue13:
«Induction is a form of argument which leads the
person with whom one is arguing to give assent to certain
undisputed facts; through this assent it wins his approval
of a doubtful proposition because this resembles the facts
to which he has assented.»14
In other words, Cicero characterises inductio as a
kind of argument that gains agreement to a doubtful
proposition by securing first agreement to some similar
uncontroversial facts. To illustrate, then, a case of induction,
Cicero reports a conversation between Aspasia, Xenophon
and his wife15, which he explicitly states to have found
apud Socraticum Aeschinen16. Here the Milesian is indeed
depicted as adopting a method to persuade her interlocutors
of claims they might not otherwise hold, by referring them
to similar things that they are more willing to accept as
true.
The well-known passage presents Aspasia as
mediating between the two spouses: the Milesian first asks
Xenophon’s wife whether, if her neighbour had a better
gold ornament, she would prefer her neighbour’s gold to
her own; next, she repeats the same question by using the
examples of clothes and «other feminine finery». In both
cases, the wife answers that she would prefer her
neighbour’s goods. Aspasia then formulates the third
question as follows: «Well now, if she had a better husband
than you have, would you prefer your husband or hers?».
The woman blushes at this, and Aspasia begins to question
to Xenophon in much the same way. Indeed, she asks the
husband the same questions by taking horses and farms as
examples; as expected, just like his wife, Xenophon
answers that he would prefer his neighbour’s horse or estate
if he had better ones. The third question too is phrased in a
similar way («now, if he had a better wife than you have,
would you prefer yours or his?») and produces a similar
reaction: Xenophon too falls silent. Then Aspasia draws
her conclusions, which is worth quoting at length together
with Cicero’s final comment:
« ‘‘Since both of you have failed to tell me the only
thing I wished to hear, I myself will tell what both of you
are thinking: that you, madam, wish to have the best
husband, and you, Xenophon, desire above all things to
have the finest wife. Therefore unless you can contrive
that there be no better man or finer woman on earth, you
will certainly always be in dire want of what you consider
best, namely, that you be the husband of the very best of
wives, and that she be wedded to the very best of men’’.
In this instance, because assent has been given to
undisputed statements, the result is that the point which
9 The double numbering of the testimonies on Aeschines refers to the collection GIANNANTONI, G., Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae,
collegit, disposuit, apparatibus notisque instruxit G. Giannantoni, Napoli, 1990 and to the edition PENTASSUGLIO, F., Eschine di Sfetto. Tutte le
testimonianze, Turnhout, 2017.
10 Besides Cicero’s testimony, see in particular Plutarch. Vit. Pericl. 24.5-6 p. 165b-c (VI A 66 SSR = 99 P.); Plat. Menex. 235e (VI A 66 SSR = 101
P.); Maxim. Tyr. Philosoph. 38.4 (VI A 66 SSR = 102 P.); Theodoret. Graec. affect. cur. 1.17 (VI A 66 SSR = 103 P.); Xen. Mem. 2.6.36 (VI A 72
SSR = 112 P.); Xen. Oecon. 3.14 (VI A 71 SSR = 111 P.).
11 I had the opportunity to tackle Cicero’s account on the Aeschinean Socrates’ method (with special regard to the role of      ) in PENTASSUGLIO,
F., «Paideutikos eros: Aspasia as an ‘alter Socrates’», Archai, 30 (2020), pp. 9-16.
12 The book ends with some final considerations about the importance of variatio (76) and a discussion about the difference between philosophy
and rhetoric. On the structure of book 1 see RASCHIERI, A. A., «Traduzione e apprendimento retorico: (Cic. inv. 1.51 s.)», Lexis, 31 (2013), pp.
315-317.
13 The whole of book 1 is rich in quotations from literary works (mostly in verse), which Cicero inserts for the sake of exemplification. The
quoting of an extensive portion of Aeschines’ dialogue must be related to the use of translations from Greek as an exercise in Latin schools of
rhetoric, a practise which is well documented in Cicero’s De oratore (1.155), in Suetonius’ De grammaticis et rhetoribus (25.4), and in Quintilian’s
Institutio oratoria (10.5.2-4).
14 All the English translations of Cicero’s De inventione are by HUBBELL, H. M., Cicero. De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica,
London, 1949 (slightly modified).
15 Other versions of the same conversation are reported by Quintilian (Inst. orat. 5.11.27-29 = VI A 70 SSR = 109 P.), who only quotes the first
part, and by Victorinus (In rhet. 1.31 p. 240, 20-241, 15 = VI A 70 SSR = 110 P.). They both depend on Cicero and thus cannot be considered
independent sources: see already HERMANN, K. F., De Aeschinis Socratici reliquiis, Göttingen, 1850, p. 16. The same anecdote (in Cicero’s
version) features in Albin. Rhet. p. 540 Halm, where it is reported in an anonymous form and referred to a philosophus quidam. In Quintilian’s
version it crops up again in Iul. Vict. Rhet. p. 408 Halm.
16 On the attribution of the fragment to Aeschines’ Aspasia, see already KRAUSS, H., Aeschinis Socratici Reliquiae, Lipsiae, 1911, p. 71 (followed
by DITTMAR, H., Aischines von Sphettos. Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker, Berlin, 1912, p. 33). He noted, however, that Cicero’s
version presumably does not represent a literal translation of Aeschines’ text («ut probabile est in scriptoribus, qui ipsi de suo, non simpliciter
imitantes, sententias fingant»; p. 43). In the absence of the original Greek text, we cannot analyse the translation technique, nor can we assess the
degree of «fidelity» to the Greek model.
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would appear doubtful if asked by itself is through analogy
conceded as certain, and this is due to the method employed
in putting the question.»
The dialogical method adopted here by Aspasia earned
her the moniker of «female Socrates», a label employed by
several scholars to depict the Milesian17. Indeed, in general
terms, the way she addresses both partners with pressing
questions, to the point of leading them into an aporia which
prevents any further answer, suggests a proximity between
Aspasia’s method and Socrates’ elenctic procedure. In the
following lines, Cicero himself is quite explicit in this regard:
«Socrates used this conversational method a good
deal, because he wished to present no arguments himself,
but preferred to get a result from the material which the
interlocutor had given him – a result which the interlocutor
was bound to approve as following necessarily from what
he had already granted.»
More particularly, Aspasia makes use of             in
her questioning, a method that –according to Aristotle (Meth.
13.4, 1078b27-29)– Socrates employed in his elenctic
investigations. It is noteworthy, in this respect, that when
Cicero goes back to the issue of      in the Topica18,
he again cites Socrates with regard to the locus ex
similitudine (42)19.
Now, strictly speaking, Aristotle ascribes Socrates
–as a contribution to a science of principles–
                            hence, not inductive arguments per se,
but rather a «technically competent handling of such
arguments»20. As is well-known, by the term «induction»
Aristotle technically refers to an argumentative movement
from the «particular»                                                to what
he calls the «universal»                21, and we would look in
vain for an occurrence of  fitting this definition in
Aeschines’ dialogues.
Nonetheless, as Ausland has clearly shown22, from a
relatively early age there is evidence of a conception of
induction different from Aristotle’s, one that makes no
recourse to a distinction between particular and general,
but rather characterises induction as an argument «from
one or more familiar things to something further that is
similar to these»23. This is precisely the acceptation of
«induction» we find in the section of De inventione at issue,
which significantly ends with an explanation of the Socratic
method. Indeed, before providing examples of inductive
reasoning drawn from civil cases (55 ff.), Cicero tackles
the issue from a theoretical point of view, in the form of a
commentary on Aeschines’ passage24.
As specified immediately afterwards, Cicero deems
it necessary for the argument that one brings forward by
way of simile to be such that «its truth must be granted»
(53). He thus believes that the consequence in view of which
one resorts to an inductive reasoning must bear a close
similarity to the premises proposed as not doubtful. The
outcome of this method is described in the Aspasia example:
the interlocutor (in this case Xenophon and his wife) can
either (1) decline to give an answer, or (2) admit the validity
of the thesis proposed or (3) deny it. Now, if the proposition
is denied, one should either show its resemblance to those
things which have been already admitted, or resort to some
other induction; if the thesis is granted, the argumentation
can be brought to a close. If, instead, the interlocutor keeps
silent, then «he must be lured into giving an answer»
(elicienda responsio est), or –since silence can be seen as a
kind of reply– one may also bring the discussion to a close,
taking the silence to be equivalent to an admission (54).
17 Aeschines’ Aspasia was first defined as a «weblicher Sokrates» by HIRZEL, R., Der Dialog. Ein literarhistorischer Versuch, Leipzig, 1895, vol.
1, p. 80. The definition was then adopted by KAHN, C. H., «Aeschines on Socratic Eros», p. 101, and DÖRING, K., «The Students of Socrates»,
in MORRISON, D. R., The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, New York, 2011, p. 31.
18 Cicero’s discussion of the inductive method had a significant influence on later accounts on this topic (by Quintilian, Fortunatianus and Marius
Victorinus): see RASCHIERI, A. A., «Traduzione e apprendimento retorico…», p. 316.
19 In all likelihood, Cicero here is following Aristotle’s Rhetoric (2.20, 1393b): indeed, when the Stagirite deals with the                  (defined as «similar
to induction»:                     as an example of comparison he puts forward the «sayings of Socrates»
20 This is how the expression is interpreted by AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 229, who highlights Aristotle’s
use of an adjective deriving from           but ending in -      He also argues that the following reference to universal definition does not refer to the
goal of Socrates’ inductive arguments, but to a distinct contribution pertaining to his investigations in the realm of morals; cf. ROBINSON, R.,
Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, pp. 48-50; contra see McCASKEY, J. P., «Induction in the Socratic Tradition», p. 163. On the mistranslation of
Aristotle’s                   as «inductive arguments», see VLASTOS, G., Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Ithaca, 1991, p. 267, who deems it
as «virtually ubiquitous in the scholarly literature».
21 See Top. 1.12; Post. An. 1.1.
22 AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 228.
23 Interestingly, Albinus (Isag. 158.1) will distinguish two kinds of induction: one from similar to similar and another from particular to general.
24 As Raschieri has pointed out, Cicero’s use of a philosophical «insertion» is far from being an accessory element or a mere exemplification of
concepts already expounded in an abstract form. On the contrary, the quotation from Aeschines’ Aspasia plays such a central role that it lends
structure to the overall argument and does not require any further addition except some brief introductory and conclusive comments; see
RASCHIERI, A. A., «Traduzione e apprendimento retorico», p. 317. Although Victorinus follows the theoretical framework of his source, he
enriches Cicero’s quotation with further elements. First, he delimits «in general» (generaliter) the scope and domain of induction, which pertains
to philosophy, rhetoric, but also «fictional stories» (etiam in fabulis). Then, he reports Cicero’s definition of inductio and provides a detailed
explanation of it. At this point he inserts the exemplum philosophicum drawn from Aeschines’ Aspasia (In rhet. 1.31 p. 240, 20-241, 15).
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Now, besides lending the whole passage the structure
of an epagogic argumentation, Aspasia uses a more specific
methodological tool, also adopted by Socrates elsewhere:
the argument by analogy25. According to the tradition
stemming from Aristotle, an inductive argument is supposed
to be based on one or more paradigmatic cases often termed
«examples» (the                 dealt with in Aristotle’s Re-
thoric, 2.20, 1393b can be interpreted as the rhetorical
version of induction)26.
In this regard, Döring27 convincingly points out
Aspasia’s goals in employing the argument by analogy,
namely:
1) to make Xenophon and his wife aware that they
are caught in an inconsistency (between their belief that
they love no one else as much as each other, and the
admission that they would favour a superior spouse, should
one came along);
2) to make them realise that they are capable of ending
this inconsistency by trying to become as virtuous as
possible.
In brief, Aspasia employs the argument by analogy
with the aim of conveying the idea that the search for a
better husband or wife is vain unless both partners aim to
be         . The promotion of moral (self-)improvement
recalls, once again, the figure of Socrates, also (but not
only)28 in Aeschines’ dialogues, and particularly (as we will
see in section III) in the Alcibiades29.
Aside from the final purpose of the argument by
analogy, a peculiar use of it seems to be shared by Aeschines’
Aspasia and Aeschines’ Socrates. Just like Socrates in the
Miltiades fragment (see section IV), the Milesian does not
use analogies with a plain explanatory or illustrative function.
More subtly, Aspasia’s questions are intended to bring to
light the undesirable consequences in which one may incur
by applying through analogy the same reasoning adopted
in previous cases –consisting in examples drawn from the
interlocutor’s everyday life– and thus by (improperly)
extending what was true for jewels and clothes, or horses
and farms, to the sphere of marital relationships.
Similarly, as regards the more general epagogic
argumentation, it may be noted that Aspasia first induces
both interlocutors to acknowledge their desire for «material»
possessions like those their neighbours might have, and
only afterwards are these possessions set in parallel to their
marital relationship. Only once the unpleasant possibility of
coveting one’s neighbour’s spouse is brought to light, can
Aspasia set out the opposite perspective of two partners
seeking to deserve each other30.
In conclusion, considering that Cicero presents the
whole conversation as reported by Socrates himself within
Aeschines’ dialogue («demonstrat Socrates cum Xenophontis
uxore […]»)31, a set of hints and references32 may be seen
to suggest that Aeschines projects some Socratic aspects
onto Aspasia. The use of inductive reasoning and of the
argument by analogy is one of them. The latter, significantly,
is employed by Aeschines’ Socrates in at least two other
works, which are worth taking specifically into account.
3. THE ALCIBIADES
A fundamental testimony on the Alcibiades (the best-
preserved work by Aeschines, along with the Aspasia) is
provided by Aelius Aristides, who quotes three fragments of
the dialogue in his De rhetorica (VI A 53 SSR = fr. 81-82 P.).
Aristides reports the three excerpts as follows:
1.61-62: «If I thought that I could be helpful
through some art                     I should find myself guilty
of much stupidity. But as it is, I thought that this had been
granted to me by a divine portion                      in respect
to Alcibiades. And none of this should be wondered at».
(62) […] «For many of the sick become well, some by
human art                                   some by a divine portion
25 For two specific types of epagogic argument, the mode of reasoning has been identified as that of inductive analogy: (a) arguments from a single
proposition or set of coordinate propositions that serve as premises to another proposition superordinate to the premise set, and (b) arguments
from a single proposition or set of coordinate propositions that serve as premises to another proposition superordinate to the premise set followed
by an inference back to a subordinate proposition (in those cases where the superordinate claim goes unmentioned); see McPHERRAN, M.,
«Socratic Epagôgê and Socratic Induction», p. 349. Cf. Arist. An. Pr. 2.24; Rhet. 2.20, 1393a26-b3 on «argument by example».
26 AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 233. ’E           has been interpreted, in turn, as part of a larger technique called
«the use of cases», which ranges from illustrative example to analogical inference from a single case, to complete enumeration: see ROBINSON, R.,
Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, pp. 43-47.
27 See DÖRING, K., «The Students of Socrates», pp. 31-32.
28 See for instance Plat. Apol. 25b.
29 According to Aelius Aristides (De rhet. 1.74), the dialogue ends with the very expression
30 See AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 232.
31 It has been argued that Aeschines may have included in the Aspasia a conversation similar to that between Socrates and Diotima in Plato’s
Symposium, as shown by the several references in the sources to the dialogical form of the discussion: see MÁRSICO, C., Los filósofos socráticos,
Testimonios y fragmentos, vol. 2: Antístenes, Fedón, Esquines y Simón, Buenos Aires, 2014, p. 404, Note 85. Such an analogy has led certain
scholars to conjecture that the Socrates-Diotima exchange in the Symposium represents Plato’s «response» to Aeschines’ Aspasia; see GAISER, K.,
«Review of B. Ehlers, Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines, Munich 1966», Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie, 51 (1969), pp. 202-204; KAHN, C. H., «Aeschines on Socratic Eros», pp. 100-101.
32 There is no shortage of sources insisting on Socrates’ relationship with Aspasia, namely Plato (Menex. 235e), Maximus of Tyre (Philosoph.
38.4), Plutarch (Vit. Pericl. 24.5-6 p. 165b-c) and Theodoret of Cyrus (Graec. aff. cur. 1.17).
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                      . Those by human art, cured by doctors; those
by a divine portion, desire leads to what will profit them»33.
1.74: «Through the love which I had  for Alcibiades
                                                                         I had felt
no different from the Bacchants. For whenever the
Bacchants become inspired, they draw milk and honey
from sources where others cannot even draw water. And
although  I  knew  no  study                                 by which
I might usefully educate a man, still I thought that by
associating with him I would improve him through love
The fragments appear in Dittmar’s collection as fr.
11a-c34, and in the following studies scholars have usually
taken it for granted that the sequence of quotations reported
by Aristides corresponds to their actual order of appearance
in Aeschines’ work35.
The first fragment (De rhet. 1.61) draws an essential
distinction between two ways in which one can «be helpful»
               to others, opposing to         an ability which is
granted              for «divine dispensation». Such an
opposition is exemplified in the following fragment (De rhet.
1.62), where the act of making other people better is
compared to healing from sickness: indeed, some sick
people  are  treated  by doctors  and recover thanks to an
               others recover              , thanks to a di-
vine dispensation by which their desire             directly
leads them to what can improve their condition and cure
them. In the third fragment (De rhet. 1.74) the above-traced
distinction is explicitly referred to Alcibiades, and the ability
to improve others is directly associated with           Socrates
denies that he possesses any art (      ) or science
to benefit  other people; nonetheless, he thought  he  could
improve  Alcibiades                  «through love»36.  This
    that he happened to be feeling                           for
the young man put him in a condition similar to that of the
Bacchants, who –filled with the god– can «draw milk and
honey from sources where others cannot even draw water».
Now, in opposition to the traditional order of the three
fragments within Aeschines’ dialogue, Joyal has
convincingly proposed a different interpretation37. While
preserving the position of the last fragment, which Aristides
himself presents as the conclusion of the dialogue, Joyal
suggests we reverse the order of the first two excerpts,
arguing that the passage on the two «ways» of healing
from sickness preceded the claims by Socrates reported
as the first fragment.
It is to be noted, first of all, that the order of the
fragments proposed by Aristides contributed to his narrative
build-up, which aimed to defend rhetoric against the attacks
carried out by Plato, especially in the Gorgias and the
Phaedrus. Aristides argues, in particular, against Plato’s
thesis that rhetoric is not a         , but an             or a
(Gorg. 463b3-4). To this end, he resorts to the authority of
Socrates, whose opinions Plato would not dare reject (see
1.62). Hence, in support of the efficacy of             as a
suitable alternative to          , he quotes the words of Aeschi-
nes’ Socrates about his personal experience with Alcibiades
(1). Then, he generalises the argument –again through
Aeschines (2)– to all activities that can equally benefit from
both       and            , among which rhetoric shall be
included (cf. 1.65). Aristides’ position, therefore, basically
draws its strength and credibility from Socrates’ example.
If, however, we shift our focus to the structure and
content of Aeschines’ dialogue, the development of the
theme of                       turns out to be more linear and
consistent according to the order proposed by Joyal (2, 1,
3): while in the second fragment Socrates speaks of
«improvement»               at the general level of certain
human activities, the references to this issue in the first
fragment                 and in the third one
             are directly applied to Alcibiades. Instead,
if we keep the passage about Alcibiades’ moral improvement
at the beginning of the sequence, we must suppose a sort
of “detour” from the point that Aeschines aimed to highlight,
with only a minor emphasis on what must have been a
crucial topic.
More generally, the new sequence of arguments
seems to lead more naturally to the third fragment, where
Socrates mentions his relationship with Alcibiades again:
given the relevance of the character of Alcibiades in the
dialogue, it is unlikely that he was mentioned only in
view of wider discussions of the concepts of                  and
      . It seems far more plausible that Aeschines intro-
duced the theme of           to give an account of the
effects on Alcibiades of his             with Socrates and of
his        .
33 The English translations of Aelius Aristides’ De rhetorica are by BEHR, C. A., P. Aelius Aristides. The complete works, vol. 1: Orations 1-16,
Leiden, 1986.
34 DITTMAR, H., Aischines von Sphettos, 272-274.
35 On the problem of the order of the three fragments within Aeschines’ dialogue –and for a more detailed analysis of their philosophical
content– I shall refer to PENTASSUGLIO, F., Eschine di Sfetto. Tutte le testimonianze, pp. 95-97 and to PENTASSUGLIO, F., «Philosophical
Synousia and Pedagogical Eros: on Socrates’ Reshaping of Paideia», Philosophie antique, 20 (2020), pp. 80-81.
36 On the ambiguous syntax of the expression                see KAHN, C. H., «Aeschines on Socratic Eros», p. 94 and KAHN, C. H., Plato and the
Socratic dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form, pp. 22-23.
37 See JOYAL, M. A., «The Conclusion of Aeschines’ Alcibiades», Rheinisches Museum, 136/3-4 (1993), pp. 264-268.
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What is more relevant for our purposes is that, if we
accept this different order, Socrates turns out to adopt
an argument by analogy: he would first be presenting
some examples drawn from human experience (sickness
and  healing), where it is possible to benefit from both
                       and                (2); then, he would be ap-
plying this opposition to his personal experience with
Alcibiades, expressing his conviction that he could improve
the young man                 and not          (1).
According to this order, Socrates employs a kind of
argumentation that finds some parallels in Aeschines’ works,
namely in the Aspasia, as we have seen, and in the
Miltiades38, as we will see in a while.
Before moving on to examine the Miltiades fragment,
however, a further testimony on the Alcibiades can be
considered for the sake of our analysis. It consists of a
brief papyrus fragment (POxy. 1608 col. I fr. A = VI A 48
SSR = 74 P.)39 where a specific type of argument by analogy
can be singled out: the so-called «expert-analogy».
Socrates’ expert-analogies have recently been dealt
with and defined by Sandstad as  «a group of arguments
where Socrates makes an analogy from an uncontroversial
expert, or an expertise, like the cobbler or ship-captain, to
another often controversial expert like the statesman»40. The
occurrence we find in Aeschines’ Alcibiades falls within
this definition:
«Do you consider that men have to begin by being
ignorant of music                      before they become musi-
cians? Or ignorant of horsemanship                         before they
become good riders?» «I think they have to begin by first
being ignorant of music and horsemanship.» (tr. G. C.
Field)41.
The fragment, which is thematically related to POxy.
1608 col. I fr. D (VI A 48 SSR = 73 P.), probably preceded
the excursus on Themistocles’ exile in Asia contained in
fragments E, F and G of the same papyrus and reported by
Aelius Aristides in De quatt. 348-349 (VI A 50 SSR = fr. 76
P.). The  dialogical  exchange  seems  to  suggest  a Socratic
          centred on the theme of the need for education:
Alcibiades, who went so far as to criticise the Athenian
politician42, had presumably put forward the argument that
Themistocles, particularly in his youth, was far from being
an exemplar (fr. D hints at the issue of Themistocles’
disinheritance by his father). In this context, Socrates may
have replied that, just as a musician or a horseman is ignorant
of his subject when he begins his career, so –by analogy– a
statesman like Themistocles was initially ignorant of
statesmanship.
Such an argument may then have led to the
digression about Themistocles’ vicissitudes in Asia43, where
Socrates insists on the fact that the statesman’s qualities,
great as they were, did not suffice to save him from a
miserable end.
This is not, however, the only occurrence of this
specific sort of argument by analogy within Aeschines’
dialogues: a second one can be found in the Miltiades.
4. THE MILTIADES
Unlike the Aspasia and the Alcibiades, the surviving
testimonies and fragments allow us to only partly
reconstruct the content of the Miltiades. The most recent
textual acquisition is represented by two papyrus fragments
which are not included in any of the editions preceding
Giannantoni’s Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae (the first
collection to have been published after the Oxyrhynchus
finds at the beginning of last century)44. The two fragments
(POxy. 2890 recto and verso = VI A 79-80 SSR = 121-122 P.)
are thematically related and deal with the issue of            .
For the purpose of our account, it is worth
commenting on just one of the two (POxy. 2890 verso):
It will [.. not ..] be at all strange, I said, if the
problem that stumps us doesn’t stump him. For it would
38 On this parallel see ROSSETTI, L. & LAUSDEI, C., «Ancora sul Milziade di Eschine Socratico: P. Oxy 2890 (Back)», Zeitschrift für Papyrologie
und Epigraphik, 33 (1979), pp. 50-51.
39 On the text and collocation of the fragment see COLLART, P., «Les papyrus d’Oxyrhynchos», Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d’Histoire
anciennes, 43 (1919), pp. 56-57; ROSSETTI, L. & ESPOSITO, A., «Socrate, Alcibiade, Temistocle e i ‘dodici dèi’», Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und
Epigraphik, 54 (1984), p. 28; ROSSETTI, L., Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, vol. 1.1: Autori noti, Firenze, 1989, p. 122.
40 SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates’ Expert-Analogies», p. 319; cf. APARICIO VILLALONGA, C., El ejemplo de los oficios
en los diálogos de Platón, pp. 18-46.
41 FIELD, G. C., Plato and his Contemporaries, London, 1948, p. 148.
42 Ael. Aristid. De quatt. 348.
43 For this hypothesis see ROSSETTI, L., Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, p. 131.
44 GRENFELL, B. P., «New Papyri from Oxyrhynchus», Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, 5/1 (1918), pp. 16-23; GRENFELL, B. P. & HUNT,
A. S., The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, 13, London, 1919, pp. 1-27.
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have been surprising if I had asked Euripides which
craftsman he should spend time with in order to best
deliberate about making shoes –he could answer
«cobblers»!– or which he should spend time with in order
to best deliberate about building houses; also in this case
he would be able to answer: «architects». But now […]
(tr. K. Lampe, modified)45.
According to the reconstruction hypothesis
proposed by Patzer46, the fragment seems to imply a question
of the following kind against the background of the
conversation: to whom should Miltiades turn to in order to
be well advised about how men should be educated?
Socrates then, setting out from an analogy with the banausic
arts, brings Euripides into the discussion and replies on his
behalf as to what «mentor» one should follow in specific
fields of expertise.
The text suggests the positing, within Socrates’
speech, of a double opposition. On the one hand, the self-
evident nature of the questions regarding the expertise
required by certain         –and particularly the (simpler)
search for appropriate teachers to learn specific craft
techniques– seems to stand in contrast to the greater
difficulty of acquiring the kind of competence to which
Socrates lays claims (and with regard to which the text
only allows us to form conjectures). On the other hand,
the fragment seems to establish an opposition between a
sure knowledge, characteristic of poets
    and a different type of knowledge, marked by
aporia
Now, as far as the first opposition is concerned, it is
plausible that Socrates’ question relates to the search for
true teachers of virtue or wisdom (given the contiguity
with POxy. 2890 recto, concerned with this topic).
The meaning of the whole passage largely depends
on the interpretation of the               at line 3, and par-
ticularly on the kind of knowledge Socrates is referring to
here. Indeed, the sense of the subsequent argument
considerably changes depending on whether the allusion is
still to the search for teachers of          –which Socrates
had conceivably discussed earlier, before moving on to the
analogy with the banausic arts– or whether he is already
referring to the latter, namely to the search for teachers
of the various            a problem that «doesn’t stump him»
If the former is the case, as I shall argue here, the
mention of Euripides may be interpreted as follows: while
Socrates and other interlocutors in the dialogue have some
difficulty in identifying the true teachers of            a poet like
Euripides has no doubt about it. Socrates’ remark in this
case would be polemic –as well as ironic, as Rossetti47 has
suggested– and directed against the poets’ pretence of
knowledge48. If this interpretation is correct, a better
understanding of the fragment may be gained through a
comparison with a parallel passage in the Memorabilia,
where Xenophon reports a conversation about justice
between Socrates and Hippias (4.4.5)49. Within this
discussion,
«He was saying that if you want to have a man
taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding, you know
where to send him to learn the craft: some indeed declare
that if you want to train up a horse or an ox in the way he
should  go,  teachers  abound.  And  yet,  strangely  enough
                             if you want to learn Justice yourself, or
to have your son or servant taught it, you know not where
to go for a teacher» (tr. E. C. Marchant)50.
Besides the common reference to craftsmanship
skills, it is worth noting that the comparison is introduced
with a similar expression                                       in Aes-
chines;                            in Xenophon), and that the difficulty
to find teachers of virtue is expressed with the same verb
             51.
The two texts thus seem to share the idea that, while
one may easily answer the question of who can teach a
particular craft technique, it is harder to identify the experts
in              a domain –we may infer from the context– which
clearly bears greater relevance52.
Also in the Miltiades fragment, therefore, Socrates
may intend to show how absurd it is to have clear ideas
about who can teach shoemaking or house-building, while
failing to detect who can teach wisdom. Put differently,
Socrates here may have emphasised the inconvenience of
not being able to single out true teachers precisely in the
most important sphere; at the same time –and for the same
45 LAMPE, K., «Rethinking Aeschines of Sphettus», in ZILIOLI, U., From the Socratics to the Socratic Schools: Classical Ethics, Metaphysics
and Epistemology, London, 2015, p. 63.
46 PATZER, A., «                           », Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, 15 (1974), p. 285. The Greek text of the papyrus just quoted also
follows Patzer’s hypothetical reconstruction (pp. 280-285).
47 ROSSETTI, L., Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, p. 145.
48 Cf. Plat. Apol. 22a-c.
49 On this parallel see already ROSSETTI, L. & LAUSDEI, C., «Ancora sul Milziade di Eschine Socratico», p. 50.
50 MARCHANT, E. C., Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes, vol. 4, Cambridge-London, 1923.
51 For the reference to shoemakers, see Plat. Men. 90b-c.
52 In this regard, a parallel can also be drawn with Xenophon’s Apology (20-21), where Socrates finds it «amazing» (again:               that while in
any field –medicine, legislative assemblies, the election of generals– the people of Athens follow the advice of experts, which they prefer to others’
opinions, they sentence to death the man who has the highest competence in education                 namely «in what is man’s greatest blessing».
ÁMBITOSI
REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y HUMANIDADES, núm. 43 (2020)
1 9
reason– he may have stressed the special difficulty of such
a search and warned against the kind of rashness in which
poets incur and to which an (undue) analogy with
leads.
Two final points can be made before moving on to
some conclusions:
1. The Miltiades fragment is included by Sandstad
among the occurrences of Socrates’ expert-analogies.
Admittedly, the mention of shoemakers and builders
connotes the argument as one of those «where Socrates
makes an analogy from an uncontroversial expert, or an
expertise»53. Socrates’ argument also seems to include a
comparison to «another often controversial expert», but
the latter cannot be indisputably identified with the statesmen,
at least according to what can be inferred from the
(fragmentary) text of the testimony.
There seems to be no textual evidence of a direct
comparison to statesmanship as a point of reference, as
Sandstad instead assumes when he hypothesises that: 1)
Socrates continued the argument by asking Euripides the
question: «but now, who should Miltiades spend time with
in order to deliberate best about statesmanship?»; 2)
Euripides answered that Miltiades needed to turn to the expert
on statesmanship (the statesman); 3) Socrates replied that
just as we should learn shoemaking from the cobbler, so
we should learn statesmanship from the statesman.
The only clue confirming this reconstruction might
come from the figure of Miltiades himself, but scholars
have convincingly argued against his identification with the
winner of the Battle of Marathon54. Moreover, if this were
really how Socrates’ argument developed, we would lose
the thematic continuity with POxy. 2890 recto.
Even apart from these considerations, if our
interpretation is correct, the Miltiades fragment features a
use of the expert-analogy different from that outlined in the
Alcibiades fragment, what leads us to the second point.
2. As in the Aspasia, the argument by analogy does
not appear to be deployed for explicative or exemplifying
purposes: the examples of cobblers and builders are
employed within an argument aimed at warning the
interlocutor against an undue, misleading analogy with these
expert figures.
According to this interpretation, Socrates would be
expounding the idea that the search for «teachers» of virtue
is particularly difficult, from which it follows that teaching
virtue is not a          like any other, and that therefore there
cannot be «experts» on         or wisdom as there are ex-
perts in other fields. It is noteworthy that such a conclusion
is in agreement with the above-mentioned testimony on the
Alcibiades (Ael. Aristid. De rhet. 1.61), where Aeschines’
Socrates disclaims being able to make Alcibiades better
             .
5. CONCLUSIONS
Owing to the fragmentary state of Aeschines’ Socratic
dialogues, the aspects of the Socratic method we have been
focusing on, namely             and the argument by analogy,
cannot be investigated in the same way as they would in
relation to Plato’s or Xenophon’s works.
A set of specifications, sub-classifications and related
issues, in particular, cannot be applied to texts whose content
largely depends on conjectures, and to dialogues whose
arguments cannot be reconstructed in their entirety. This is
the case, for instance, with the three types of                  singled
out by Robinson55, with the further distinctions drawn by
McPherran56, and with the different possible interpretations
of the expert-analogies (as intuitive, analytic, probabilistic,
or statistically probabilistic) discussed at length by Sandstad,
who ultimately interprets them as deductively valid
inferences57.
Yet, some final considerations can be made in the
light of the broader accounts in Plato and Xenophon (and
in related studies).
As far as the epagogic argumentation is concerned,
we can rely on a single continuous account in Aeschines’
dialogues: in the Aspasia passage examined in section II,
Aspasia adopts an inductive reasoning that –according to
Cicero’s definition– is intended to win the interlocutor’s
approval of a doubtful proposition based on its resemblance
to «certain undisputed facts» to which he or she has
assented.
In the absence of any point of comparison –since
the Alcibiades fragments are not quoted as a continuous
passage, we do not have enough context– we are evidently
unable to distinguish and discuss different types of
53 SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates’ Expert-Analogies», p. 319.
54 See already HERMANN, K. F., De Aeschinis Socratici reliquiis, p. 10, who refers to Herodotus’ account (6.38); see also ROSSETTI, L., Corpus
dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, pp. 137-138 and PATZER, A., «                        »,  p. 274, note 12.
55 ROBINSON, R., Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, pp. 35-38.
56 McPHERRAN, M., «Socratic Epagôgê and Socratic Induction», p. 349 ff.
57 SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates’ Expert-Analogies», pp. 322-329.
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in Aeschines’ works. Nonetheless, one may cautiously argue
that Aspasia does not use her list of cases to explain her
claim to Xenophon and his wife (as, for example, Socrates
does with Eutyphro in Plat. Euthyph. 10a-d)58. Hence, this
use of epagogic argumentation does not seem to be traced
back to the so-called «explicative             » (what Vlastos
called «intuitive induction»). It rather resembles another form
of          , singled out by McPherran (contra Vlastos),
which Socrates would use «to persuade interlocutors to
adopt various beliefs»59. Indeed, Aspasia’s argumentation
seems to fit the definition provided for this kind of                 ,
whereby Socrates «reveals belief-inconsistency in
interlocutors only after he convinces them to adopt a belief
or two that they had not previously held (beliefs inconsistent
with other, possibly less-well-grounded beliefs they already
profess to hold)»60. While, however, the Aspasia passage
seems to confirm that Socratic             could rise from the
level of mere explanation («explicative            ») to the
level of what McPherran calls «inductive» or «persuasive»
           , the textual evidence at our disposal does not
permit to go so far as to interpret it as a «probable inductive
generalization employing a survey of coordinate cases
involving intuition of the universal»61.
Similarly, although the Alcibiades fragments may be
seen as describing a case of inductive generalisation –from
the specific case of healing people from sickness to the
more general ability of «benefiting» or «improving» others–
it should be noted that (just as in the Aspasia) such
generalisations are adduced only in relation to some
concrete case under consideration. Moreover, the Aeschinean
Socrates never offers a classic inductive generalisation
composed of a large number of samples. However, this
raises the thorny issue of the distinction between Greek
    and modern induction, which cannot be addressed
within the limits of this paper62.
What can be noted, before moving on to some final
remarks about the argument by analogy, is that to neither
passage from Aeschines’ works can we apply Aristotle’s
definition of          as a «passage from particulars to
universals» (Top. 1.12), or its exemplification («the
argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective,
and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled
man is the best at his particular task»)63, which instead bear
some resemblance to Socrates’ argument in Plat. Euthyd.
279d-280b. As noted by Ausland64, while Aristotle’s
illustration ends with a general proposition, otherwise
parallel passages in Socratic literature tend to reach a
particular conclusion – albeit of a different order from the
argumentative examples adduced for its sake. Aeschines’
account thus seems to reinforce his conclusion that Aristotle
both defines and exemplifies inductive argumentation in more
abstract terms than Socratic literature.
As regards, more specifically, the argument by
analogy, our analysis has revealed at least two uses or
functions of this methodological tool.
1. In the Aspasia and in the Miltiades the argument
by analogy (including the sub-type of the expert-analogy)
is employed by Aspasia/Socrates to indirectly achieve their
final aim, and hence with an (at least initially) negative
function. The enumeration of coordinate cases is not
designed to directly lead the interlocutor to an inductive
generalisation; indeed, by applying the same reasoning
formerly adopted by analogy for previous cases, he or she
ends up in aporia or error: the undesirable conclusion that
one prefers one’s neighbour’s partner to one’s own (in the
Aspasia), or the fallacious conclusion that teachers of virtue
or wisdom can be found as easily as the teachers of some
specific          (in the Miltiades).
 In both cases the use of analogies paves the way
for a different, less obvious conclusion. Within the
conversation with Xenophon and his wife, Aspasia resorts
to a set of analogies to induce the spouses to acknowledge
that they will always be in search of what they consider
best, unless they are able to ensure that there will be «no
better man or finer woman on earth». In brief, the argument
by analogy «Socratically» serves the aim of promoting moral
improvement in others.
In the Miltiades –if the interpretation proposed is
correct– the use of analogies occurs within an argument
which raises two crucial points in Socratic philosophy: on
the one hand, the opposition between two kinds of
knowledge and (presumably) the critique of poets’
58 McPHERRAN, M., «Socratic Epagôgê and Socratic Induction», p. 349, note 6.
59 Ibid., p. 349. McPherran argues, in particular, against the assumption that «virtually all cases of epagoge are cases of explicative epagoge»
(ibid., p. 355), so interpreting Socratic           as the «ancestor of those inductive inferences that lead interlocutors to what they ought to believe»
(ibid., p. 359).
60 Ibid., p. 354. For some parallels in Plato and Xenophon, cf. Charm. 159b-160d; 167c-168b (see also Euthyph. 7a6-8a8; Lach. 192b9-193d8)
and Mem. 1.2.9.
61 Ibid., p. 363.
62 On this problem (and for the relevant bibliography), see AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», pp. 224-228
(particularly note 2), to which I shall also refer for a detailed overview of modern interpretations of Aristotle’s definition of the term; cf. ANNAS,
J., Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Books M and N, Oxford, 1976, p. 154.
63 Sandstad goes so far as to affirm that expert-analogies should not be treated as inductions at all, but are much better seen as illustrative parallels.
In his opinion, in Meth. 13.4, 1078b27-29 Aristotle is actually thinking of             rather than of           , and hence the emphasis on induction in
the scholarly literature is misleading: see SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates’ Expert-Analogies», p. 320 and note 4.
64 AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 229.
´
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knowledge65; on the other hand, the difficulty of finding
truly “competent” people in the domain of            66, espe-
cially when one expects to find them among the experts on
other         .
2. Quite differently, in the Alcibiades Socrates adopts
an argument by analogy in order to draw a fundamental
distinction between           and                  as two alternative
ways in which one can improve others (Alcibiades, in his
case). Healing from sickness –which can occur either
through an                     or by divine dispensation–
represents an example that Socrates draws from human
experience in order to lay claim to the ability to improve the
young man                , and more specifically «through love»
(as stated in 1.74). The argument by analogy thus seems to
be employed, in this case, with a more explicit corroborative
function, although we are not able to determine whether
Socrates, in the dialogue, specifically resorts to it in order
to obtain or cement the interlocutor’s consent to his claim.
Moreover, the reference to sickness and healing, that
is to say to the medical art, once again recalls the domain of
        . Aelius Aristides’ testimony can thus be connected to
the papyrus fragment from the same dialogue (POxy. 1608
col. I fr. A), mentioning musicians and horsemen, and to
the one from the Miltiades (POxy. 2890 verso) dealing with
cobblers and builders67.
In conclusion, although the surviving testimonies do
not allow us to reconstruct the logical framework of the
Aeschinean Socrates’ expert analogies, some basic
resemblances can be outlined between Aeschines’ account
and those provided by Plato and Xenophon. First, all three
of them make ethics an integral part of Socrates’
methodological toolbox: Socrates is not presented as seeking
to logically infer universal statements though the complete
enumeration of particular cases; he rather chooses examples
which prove suitable for gaining his interlocutors’
agreement. Second, as a consequence, the choice of
exemplary cases closely depends on the context: as emerges
particularly from the Aspasia passage, the various groups
of exempla are used with a view to their familiarity to the
interlocutors68. Finally, in Aeschines’ account we can easily
glimpse the Socrates who, in Plato, «prattles» (as his
interlocutors often complain) about menial craftspeople in
order to test general principles concerning the «craft» of
virtue69, as well as the Socrates depicted by Xenophon,
whose favourite topic is «cobblers, builders and metal
workers»70.
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